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In many countries worldwide health worker shortages are one of the main constraints in 
achieving population health goals.  Financial-incentive programmes for return of service, 
whereby participants receive payments in return for a commitment to practice for a 
period of time in a medically underserved area, can alleviate local and regional health 
worker shortages through a number of mechanisms.  First, they can redirect the flow of 
those health workers who would have been educated without financial incentives from 
well-served to underserved areas.  Second, they can add health workers to the pool of 
workers who would have been educated without financial incentives and place them in 
underserved areas.  Third, financial-incentive programmes may improve the retention in 
underserved areas of those health workers who participate in a programme, but who 
would have worked in an underserved area without any financial incentives.  Fourth, the 
programmes may increase the retention of all health workers in underserved areas by 
reducing the strength of some of the reasons why health workers leave such areas, 
including social isolation, lack of contact with colleagues, lack of support from medical 
specialists, and heavy workload. 
 
We draw on studies of financial-incentive programmes and other initiatives with similar 
objectives to discuss seven management functions that are essential for the long-term 
success of financial-incentive programmes: financing (programmes may benefit from 
innovative donor financing schemes, such endowment funds, international financing 
facilities, or compensation payments), promotion (programmes should utilize tested 
communication channels in order to reach secondary school graduates and health 3 
 
workers), selection (programmes may use selection criteria to ensure programme success 
and to achieve supplementary policy goals), placement (programmes may use matching 
of participants to areas to ensure programme success), support (programmes should 
prepare participants for the time in an underserved area, stay in close contact with 
participants throughout the different phases of enrolment, and help participants by 
assigning them mentors, establishing peer support systems, or financing education 
courses relevant to work in underserved areas), enforcement (programmes may utilize 
community-based monitoring or outsource enforcement to existing institutions), and 
evaluation (in order to broaden the evidence on the effectiveness of financial incentives 
in increasing the health workforce in underserved areas, programmes in developing 
countries should evaluate their performance).   
 
In comparison to other interventions to increase the supply of health workers to medically 
underserved areas, financial-incentive programmes have advantages – unlike initiatives 
using non-financial incentives, they establish legally enforceable commitments to work in 
underserved areas and, unlike compulsory service policies, they will not be opposed by 
health workers – as well as disadvantages – unlike initiatives using non-financial 
incentives, they may not improve the working and living conditions in underserved areas 
(which are important determinants of health workers' long-term retention) and, unlike 
compulsory service policies, they cannot guarantee that they will supply health workers 
to underserved areas who would not have worked in such areas without financial 
incentives.  Financial incentives, non-financial incentives, and compulsory service are not 




In many countries, one of the main constraints in achieving population health goals is the 
lack of health workers.  The 2004 Joint Learning Initiative (JLI) for Human Resources 
for Health estimated that “Sub-Saharan countries must nearly triple their current numbers 
of workers by adding the equivalent of one million workers through retention, 
recruitment, and training if they are to come close to approaching the MDGs [Millennium 
Development Goals] for health”[1], and the 2006 World Health Report concluded that 
“[t]he severity of the health workforce crisis in some of the world’s poorest countries is 
illustrated by WHO estimates that 57 of them (36 of which are in Africa) have a deficit of 
2.4 million doctors, nurses and midwives” [2].   
 
Interventions to alleviate health worker shortages in medically underserved areas
1 include 
selective recruitment of those individuals into health care education who are (given 
observable characteristics) most likely to remain in such areas, training specifically for 
practice in underserved areas, improvements in working or living conditions, compulsion 
or incentives to serve in specific areas (compare [3]).  The topic of the present article is 
financial incentives for return of medical service in underserved areas: A health worker 
                                                 
1 A medically underserved area is an area where the number of health workers falls below a target.  There 
are many different methods to determine health worker targets, including methods based on need (i.e., the 
number of health workers necessary to achieve certain population health goals), demand (i.e., the number 
of health workers sufficient to supply the health services demanded by patients), or supply (i.e., the number 
of health workers sufficient to staff existing health care facilities).  Commonly, a mix of need, demand and 
supply criteria is used in the definition of underserved area – see below for examples of definitions that 
have been used by financial-incentive programs.  In this article, we use the term “medically underserved 
area” to denote any area that has been identified as a placement site for health workers enrolled in 
financial-incentive programs, independent of the particular definition used. 5 
 
enters into a contract to practice for a number of years in an underserved area in exchange 
for a financial pay-off.   
 
Table 1 shows the characteristics of five different types of financial-incentive 
programmes that have been described in the literature [4-6]: service-requiring 
scholarships (“conditional scholarships”) (e.g., [7-9]), educational loans with service 
requirement (e.g., [10]), service-option educational loans (e.g., [11]), loan repayment 
programmes (e.g., [12]), and direct financial incentives (e.g., [13]).  These programme 
types differ according to the time a (future) health worker commits to participation 
(before, during, or after completion of health care education), the time when participants 
receive monetary payments (during or after completion of health care education), 
spending restrictions on the received payments (for educational purposes only or for any 
purpose), and the type of obligation (service and/or financial repayment).
2 
 
All five types of financial-incentive programmes can potentially serve to increase the 
numbers of health workers in underserved areas through four mechanisms.  First, they 
may increase the supply of those health workers who would have been educated without 
financial incentive in underserved areas by decreasing the supply in well-served areas.  
For instance they may decrease the net emigration flows of nurses and physicians from 
the developing world to developed countries [14-16].  This first mechanism can take hold 
                                                 
2 All service-option educational loan programmes offer a choice between service and repayment of the 
financial incentive.  The other four types of programmes commonly offer a “buy-out” option.  Service-
requiring scholarships with a buy-out option are similar to service-option education loans.  However, while 
programme managers of service-option loans would normally consider repayment and service equally 
desirable outcomes, managers of service-requiring scholarships would normally prefer service over buy-
out.  This difference manifests itself in the fact that given equal financial incentives, a buy-out is commonly 
more expensive than the financial repayment of an educational loan. 6 
 
if there are health workers who normally would not work in underserved areas, but who 
are willing to do so in return for a financial incentive.  Second, they may add health 
workers to the pool of workers who would have been educated without financial 
incentives and place them in underserved areas.  This second mechanism can take hold if 
there are qualified candidates who normally would not have the means to finance a health 
care education, but who can afford to do so, if they receive financial incentives, and if a 
country’s health care education system can absorb additional students.  Third, financial-
incentive programmes may improve the retention in underserved areas of those health 
workers who participate in a programme, but who would have worked in an underserved 
area without any financial incentives (for instance, because the contractual obligation of 
the programmes is longer than the average time health workers would have remained in 
an underserved area without financial incentive).  Fourth, programmes may increase the 
retention of all health workers in underserved areas by improving the supply of health 
workers to underserved areas and thus reducing the strength of some of the reasons why 
health workers leave such areas, e.g., social isolation [17], lack of contact with colleagues 
[18], lack of support from medical specialists [19], or heavy workload [17, 18, 20]). 
 
We have previously shown that a specific type of financial-incentive programme, 
scholarships in return for a commitment to deliver antiretroviral treatment in SSA, is 
highly cost-beneficial under a wide range of assumptions [21].  In a recent systematic 
review, we identified 42 studies evaluating financial incentive programmes for return of 
service [22].  With the exception of one study from rural South Africa [7], all of the 
reviewed studies evaluate programmes in developed countries (33 studies took place in 7 
 
the US, five in Japan, two in Canada, and one New Zealand).  While financial-incentive 
programmes in other countries have not been evaluated in published studies, they have 
nevertheless been used, for instance in Swaziland [23], Ghana [24], and Mexico [25].  
Table A1 in the appendix shows an overview of studies of financial-incentive programme 
results (i.e., descriptions of outcomes among programme participants without comparison 
to outcomes among non-participants), programme effects (i.e., analysis of programme 
effectiveness at the individual-level through comparison of outcomes among participants 
and non-participants), and programme impacts (i.e., analysis of programme effectiveness 
at the population level, such as changes in physicians density or population mortality) 
[22].  The table describes the type of study, the type of outcome observed in the study, 
and the main study findings.  Overall, the existing evidence suggests that financial-
incentive programmes can be effective in increasing the supply of health workers
3 to 
underserved areas.  Programmes recruit substantial proportions of participants to 
underserved areas (the random-effects estimate of the pooled recruitment proportion 
across the studies in our review was 71% (95% confidence interval 60-80%)) [22].  In 
addition, a number of studies have found that programme participants are more likely 
than health workers who do not participate in a financial-incentive programme to remain 
in underserved areas in the long run [27-30]. 
 
                                                 
3 The majority of published studies on financial-incentive programs examine programs for doctors [22].  
However, a number of articles investigate programs that enrol other health professionals in addition to 
doctors, such as nurses, pharmacists, or dentists [7, 11, 26].  As these programs demonstrate, many aspects 
of the operations of a financial-incentive program are not specific to one type of health worker.  In most 
instances in this article, we thus use the general term “health workers” rather than the name of any specific 
category of health worker. 8 
 
Financial-incentive programmes may be an attractive intervention to increase the supply 
of health workers to medically underserved areas for a number of reasons.  First, they can 
subsidize the education of poor students, thus potentially increasing equity of access to 
higher education.  Second, unlike many of the other strategies to attract health workers to 
underserved areas (such as selective recruitment and training or improvements in 
working and living conditions [3]), they establish legally enforceable commitments to 
work in underserved areas and should thus more reliably increase the size of the health 
workforce in underserved areas.  Third, unlike compulsory service policies, they will not 
be opposed by health workers. 
 
However, financial-incentive programmes are not easy to implement [11, 24, 31, 32].  In 
this article, we discuss seven management functions that are essential for the long-term 
success of financial-incentive programmes (Figure 1).  First, programmes need a 
sustainable source of financing to pay for the financial incentives and programme 
administration (financing).  Next, programmes need to promote their offers in order to 
attract candidates for participation (promotion), select participants out of the pool of 
candidates (selection), and place the selected participants in medically underserved areas 
(placement).  Finally, programmes should support the participants during all phases of 
enrolment (support), enforce the service obligations (enforcement), and evaluate whether 
programme objectives are achieved (evaluation).   
 
In the following, we describe insights from published studies regarding how these seven 
management functions can be performed.  We draw not only on studies of financial-9 
 
incentive programmes, but also on initiatives whose objectives or functions partially 
overlap with those of financial-incentive programmes.  For instance, educational-loan 
programmes share with financial-incentive programmes the objective to recruit 
participants to receive financial support for education and the management functions of 
financing, promotion, selection, support, enforcement, and evaluation; and compulsory 
service policies share with financial-incentive programmes the objective to increase the 
supply of qualified workers to certain communities and the management functions of 
placement, support, enforcement, and evaluation.   
 
The seven management functions  
First function: financing 
Four of the five types of financial-incentive programmes shown in Table 1 necessarily 
require ongoing external financing, while one type (educational loans with service 
requirement) could theoretically finance itself in the long term if the total amount of 
money repaid in a period of time equalled at least the total amount required to finance the 
new incentives given out over the same period of time plus the programme’s 
administration costs.  Such a steady state of revolving refinance, however, will take a 
long time to achieve because student loans will only start to be repaid after many years of 
initial investment [33].  Moreover, both in developed and in developing countries existing 
student loan programmes usually require financial injections even in the long term, 
because losses due to unemployment, default, illness, or refusal to repay are usually not 
priced into the repayment amounts.  If they were, such programmes would not be an 
attractive option for education finance for many eligible students and would increase the 10 
 
rate of repayment refusal among those students who do take out an educational loan [34].  
While substantial long-term finance is thus required for the incentive programmes, in 
many developing countries public finance for such programmes may not be available 
because governments commonly receive only limited tax revenues, face borrowing 
constraints, or may not be able to increase the proportion of public finance allocated to 
spending on education for political reasons [35].   
 
An alternative is to finance the incentive programmes through aid from donors.  
However, traditional donor financing may not be well-suited for this purpose, which may 
explain why large international donors have not yet supported financial-incentive 
programmes.  For one, donors tend to finance projects for periods that may not be 
sufficiently long to create sustainable programmes and they may be reluctant to provide 
“running cost” support for training health workers [35].  The latter problem is highlighted 
by recent discussions about whether large disease-specific aid agencies, e.g., PEPFAR, 
the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, and the GAVI Alliance, 
should invest in human resources for health in developing countries [1, 36-38].  In 
addition, countries which cannot achieve an intended increase in the rate of health worker 
education through financial-incentive programmes because of limited education capacity 
may need substantial start-up financing to build educational institutions and to educate 
health care teachers.
4  The relatively constant flows of traditional donor financing may 
not allow substantial initial investment with lower rates of continuing finance. 
                                                 
4 In particular situations, countries may be able to increase education rates of health workers through 
financial-incentive programs without large start-up investment in additional health care education capacity.  
For instance, some countries in sub-Saharan Africa, such as Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland, fund their 
citizens’ health care education in other countries, if the prospective health workers commit to service in 11 
 
 
Recent innovation in donor funding may address both shortcomings.  On the one hand, 
donor-financed endowment funds [42] can provide steady long-term money flows well-
suited to fund scholarships, loans and salary support.  On the other hand, organizations 
such as the International Finance Facility for Immunisation (IFFIm) [43] can leverage 
development aid by issuing bonds on international capital markets against long-term 
commitments of annual payments from donor nations in order to "frontload" aid, 
allowing immediate large-scale investments (such as in education infrastructure) [44]. 
 
Another financing option would be compensation payments from countries receiving 
health workers to those countries losing them.  It has been argued that developed 
countries that recruit health workers from African countries with severe health worker 
shortages have an ethical obligation to compensate the governments of these countries for 
the loss [45].  While there may be a number of practical problems in implementing 
compensation payments – for instance, the 2005 Report of the Global Commission on 
International Migration [46] points out that migrating professionals commonly work in 
more than one country, in which case it is unclear which country is responsible for the 
payments – financial-incentive programmes seem an especially fitting purpose on which 
                                                                                                                                                 
their home countries after graduation.  This strategy, however, may only be feasible for countries with 
relatively small population sizes and good relationships with countries that have unused health care 
education capacity.  Moreover, the strategy carries the danger that health care workers educated abroad will 
not return to their country of origin [39].  Financial-incentive programs could also be used to motivate 
health workers from relatively well-served countries to practice in relatively underserved countries [40].  In 
this case, underserved countries would benefit from education capacity in well-served countries.  Such use 
of financial incentive programs could make important contributions to health care in many regions of the 
world [41].  For countries as a whole, however, such incentivized migration is unlikely to be a sufficient or 
sustainable solution.   12 
 
to spend such payments because they would contribute to decreasing similar losses in the 
future. 
 
Second function: promotion 
The pool of potential candidates to apply for participation in a financial-incentive 
programme depends on the start of the programme relative to the stage of health care 
education (Table 1).  In the case of service-requiring scholarships, educational loans with 
service requirement and service-option loans, potential candidates will be the secondary 
school graduates who are qualified to pursue a health care education [35].  In the case of 
loan repayments and direct financial incentives, it will be fully qualified health care 
professionals who are eligible for participation.  The ratio of potential to de-facto 
applicants will depend on the knowledge of the programme among eligible people as well 
as the attractiveness of the programme conditions.  There is little published evidence 
about how secondary school students attain knowledge of tertiary education, including 
financing options [47-50].  However, a range of communication channels have been 
successfully used to increase students’ knowledge of behaviours to reduce health risks 
[51].  They include classroom or group sessions led by teachers [52, 53] or peers [54, 55], 
or printed material [56].  As post-graduate students and health care professionals 
commonly use the internet [57-61] and e-mail [62-64] to access and exchange medical 
information, financial-incentive programmes for fully qualified health workers may be 
successfully promoted through advertisements on websites or through e-mail campaigns. 
 13 
 
Third function: selection 
Selection of programme participants among all candidates who apply for a place in a 
financial-incentive programme can contribute to achieving the main objective of the 
programme, i.e., to increase the supply health workers to medically underserved areas, as 
well as supplementary policy goals.  One strategy to maximize the effectiveness of the 
programme in increasing the supply of health workers to underserved areas is to select 
candidates based on characteristics that have been observed to be associated with a low 
probability of defaulting on the service obligation and a high probability of remaining in 
an underserved area after completion of the obligation.  There is evidence from both 
developing countries [65-67] and developed countries [65, 68-72] that health care 
students from rural background are more likely to choose rural practice than their peers 
from urban areas.  For instance, a 2003 study from South Africa found that ten years after 
graduating from medical school doctors of rural origin were 3.5 times more likely than 
doctors of urban origin to practice in rural areas [67].  In settings where the selected 
students would have attained a health care degree even if they had not received the 
financial incentive, it is difficult to judge whether selective recruitment does indeed 
maximize programme effectiveness [27].  The selected students might have taken up 
practice and remained in medically underserved areas, even if they had not received a 
financial incentive for return of service.  However, in many developing countries, large 
proportions of students with characteristics associated with a high propensity to practice 
in medically underserved areas (such as poor rural students) will be unable to finance a 
health care education without financial support.  In these countries, a selective 
recruitment strategy is likely to improve the effectiveness of financial-incentive 14 
 
programmes in increasing the supply of health workers to underserved areas (compare 
[3]). 
 
Policy makers can also use selection into a financial-incentive programme to achieve 
supplementary health care education goals.  Financial equity in access to tertiary 
education could be improved if eligibility for the financial incentives were based on a 
means test [73].  Merit could be rewarded if eligibility were based on secondary school 
performance.  The proportion of health care students from traditionally underrepresented 
population groups (e.g., women or underrepresented ethnicities) could be increased if 
these groups received a proportion of the incentives higher than their proportion in the 
eligible population. 
 
Fourth function: placement 
Placement of programme participants in particular underserved areas is likely to be an 
important determinant of programme success.  Policy makers first need to decide on a 
definition or a process to decide which areas to designate as “medically underserved”.  
Some programmes in developed countries have used simple definitions of “medically 
underserved areas” (e.g., rural communities with populations of 5,000 or less [74] or 
towns or villages with populations of 2,500 or less [10]); while others have designated 
areas as underserved through committee consensus informed by a range of criteria (e.g., 
health worker-to-population ratios, demographic characteristics of the population, and 
population health [75, 76]).  Once areas have been designated as “medically 
underserved”, individual programme participants need to be matched to specific 15 
 
underserved areas.  In order to maximize the social value of financial-incentive 
programmes, policy makers could consider placing participants preferentially in those 
underserved areas where unmet health care need is greatest, because the impact of a 
placement on population health in these areas is likely to be most significant.  Without 
such a preferential placement policy, it is possible that the neediest population will 
benefit least from financial-incentive programmes. For instance, one study of the 
National Health Service Corps (NHSC), a national financial-incentive programme that 
has operated in the United States since 1972 [77], found that the poorer an underserved 
area and the worse its population health, the less likely it was to receive a physician who 
is obligated to work in an underserved area [78]. 
 
However, such a policy would strongly restrict participants’ choice of placement area. As 
a result, participants may be less likely to be satisfied with their work and personal life 
during the obligated service, decreasing the chances of long-term retention in the 
placement area.  For instance, one study of the NHSC concludes that NHSC enrolees 
“placed in rural sites in the late 1980s experienced a site-matching process that they felt 
offered few acceptable sites” and “offered little opportunity to locate the best-suited site 
among those offered” [32].  A study from South Africa found that physicians were 
dissatisfied with their compulsory community service placements inter alia because, they 
were forced to serve in a particular location and because their social lives were disrupted 
[79] – two problems that should be less likely to occur if programme participants were 
given the choice to serve in one of many underserved areas.  A number of studies in the 
US have found that programme participants were significantly less likely to remain in the 16 
 
same underserved area over time than health workers who worked in underserved areas 
but had not participated in any financial-incentive programme [12, 27, 32, 80].  However, 
several other studies in the US have found that participants in financial-incentive 
programmes are more likely to continue to practice in some underserved area [27, 32] or 
to provide care to an underserved population [28, 30, 32] than health workers who had 
chosen – without financial incentive – to start practicing in an underserved area at the 
same time that programme participants started serving their obligations.  These findings 
can be explained as follows.  Participants in financial-incentive programmes are more 
likely to practice in underserved areas in the long run than non-participants, including 
those health workers who initially choose to work in underserved areas without financial 
incentive.  However, placement does not lead to optimal matches between participants 
and areas.  In order to improve their satisfaction with their practice location, participants 
thus relocate from the placement area to another underserved area after having completed 
their service obligations.  
 
Financial-incentive programmes aiming to attain high retention of obligated health 
workers in the placement area should attempt to accommodate health workers’ wishes to 
practice in particular underserved areas as far as possible.  Optimal placement could be 
achieved, for instance, by a matching process such as the one used for specialist training 
places in the US , whereby candidates and training institutions rank each other in order of 
declining preference and a computer algorithm implements explicit rules to identify the 
best assignment of candidates to institutions [81].   
 17 
 
Fifth function: support 
It is likely that the satisfaction of health workers with their participation in financial-
incentive programmes will be important in determining whether they start and complete 
their service obligations and whether they remain in an underserved area in the long run 
[80].  Evidence from the US shows that participants’ work and life satisfaction can vary 
substantially by programme type [12, 80].  Such differences across programmes can be 
due to a number of reasons.  Different types of health workers may choose to participate 
in different programmes, and programmes may differ in how far they take participants’ 
wishes into account in selecting placement areas (see above).  However, programmes 
may also be able to influence participants’ satisfaction before and during their time of 
service by offering support.  For instance, the NHSC has developed “tools to prepare 
providers for underserved areas”, which include learning modules on “personal and 
professional development”, “cross cultural issues in primary care”, “leading group 
discussions”, and health care issues important in working with “disenfranchised 
populations” (such adolescent pregnancy, HIV/AIDS, child abuse, domestic violence, 
substance abuse) [82].  In addition, the NHSC has established a “recruitment, training and 
support center” which maintains contact with underserved areas, offers “guidance and 
support to NHSC scholars during the relocation process”, and monitors participants 
during their service [83].  
 
The Friends of Mosvold Scholarship Scheme (FOMSS), which provides scholarships to 
health care students from the rural Umkhanyakude district of South Africa in return for a 
commitment to work in the district after graduation [84], assigns each participant a 18 
 
mentor.  The mentor supports the participant during her studies: “Regular visits to the 
campuses supplemented by telephone calls by the main mentor made the students feel 
that he was there for them and that he cared. Struggling students were encouraged to 
analyse their situation using questions such as ‘What do you think is the problem?’ and 
‘What have you done to find a solution?’. Wherever practicable, solutions were found 
quickly and included interventions such as the student (and sometimes the mentor) 
contacting a lecturer or head of department, finding better accommodation, or providing a 
computer for FOMSS students where university resources were inadequate, etc. [7]”. 
 
As described for FOMSS, ongoing contact with participants enables managers of 
financial-incentive programmes to detect difficulties that health workers are facing and to 
intervene rapidly.  In addition to assigning participants to mentors, programmes can 
ensure that they remain in close contact with participants through regular meetings with 
individual health workers, discussions with groups of participants, telephone hotlines 
[83], or frequent surveys of participant satisfaction [19, 85, 86].   Programmes can offer 
support by initiating peer group meetings [79], establishing peer-support systems, such as 
Balint groups [87], paying for education courses that teach skills relevant to health care in 
underserved areas [88], or funding equipment that participants need in their clinical work.   
    
Sixth function: enforcement 
Programme participants can default on their obligation in several different ways.  In 
programmes without repayment or buy-out option, they can, firstly, refuse placement and 
service after having received the financial incentive and, secondly, comply with 19 
 
placement but fail to perform the specific duties they are obliged to perform in the 
placement area. An example of the latter type of default is a physician who fails to fulfil 
her obligation to work in a public-sector hospital in the placement area and instead sees 
patients in private practice.  While the first type of default is comparatively easy to detect 
(for instance, through spot checks or calls to local hospital administrators), the second 
type can be difficult to detect (for instance, if the health services administration in the 
placement area is weak).  In programmes with a buy-out option, participants default if 
they neither fulfil their service obligation nor repay the financial incentive.   
 
In order to ensure that participants fulfil their obligations, programmes must have a 
monitoring strategy in place to identify defaulters, as well as a strategy to deal with 
detected defaulters.  Such strategies will depend on legal, institutional, and technological 
factors specific to a country.  Experiences from educational-loan programmes in Africa 
suggest that rather than building up an infrastructure to monitor default on service or 
financial obligations themselves, financial-incentive programmes should outsource this 
function to existing institutions that already have the structures and experience to deal 
with contractual default, such as the tax system, the social security system, or banks [73]. 
 
An alternative to using such large existing systems to monitor participants is community-
based monitoring approaches [89], including monitoring through local leaders, citizen 
report cards (“participatory surveys that provide quantitative feedback on user 
perceptions on the quality, adequacy and efficiency of public services”, i.e., the services 
of health workers participating in financial-incentive programmes [90]), or community 20 
 
score cards (“qualitative monitoring tools that are used for local level monitoring and 
performance evaluation of services” [90]).  Community-based monitoring may be 
preferable for relatively small local financial-incentive programmes. 
 
Monitoring and punishment are reactive approaches to reduce default.  Preventive 
strategies to decrease default rates include regulation, such as withholding diplomas or 
licenses from scholarship recipients until they have completed their service [35], 
requiring completion of the obligated service for specialist training [66], or restricting the 
visa eligibility of obligated health workers before completion of their service [15]. 
 
Seventh function: evaluation 
A large number of descriptive case studies and cohort studies have evaluated financial-
incentive programmes (Table A1) [22].  However, with one exception from South Africa 
[7], all of the published evaluations have taken place in developed countries.  In order to 
improve the scope of the existing evidence, financial-incentive programmes in 
developing countries should collect quantitative and qualitative data on their experiences 
and outcomes and publish them. 
 
While the evidence on the effects of financial-incentive programmes on recruitment and 
long-term retention in underserved areas is extensive, it has a number of limitations.  For 
one, the evidence may not be generalizable to many of the countries that suffer from the 
most severe shortages of health workers in rural and remote areas, in particular sub-
Saharan African countries.  The majority of published evaluations of financial-incentive 21 
 
programmes have taken place in the US (Table 1A).  Only one article has examined a 
financial-incentive programme in a developing country (South Africa).  The US health 
care education system, however, is unusual in comparison to many other countries in that 
students pay high tuition for their education.  Within the US, it has been found that 
medical students’ propensity to enrol in a financial-incentive programme increases with 
their debt burden [32].  Thus, it would seem plausible that in countries where health care 
education is subsidized to such an extent that students have to pay very little tuition, 
financial-incentive programmes could be substantially less attractive than in the US.  
However, in a number of countries with very low tuition for health care education, 
students nevertheless incur substantial expenses, for instance, for housing, meals, medical 
textbooks and equipment [91], requiring them to seek funding support, for instance, 
through a financial-incentive programme.  Future studies should evaluate outcomes of 
financial-incentive programmes in developing countries, such as Swaziland [23], Ghana 
[24], and Mexico [25]. 
 
Another fundamental difference between the US and many of the developing countries 
that currently face severe health worker shortages is that the income differential between 
underserved and well-served areas is larger in the latter than in the former.  Pathman and 
colleagues find that US physicians fulfilling a service commitment in underserved areas 
did not earn significantly less than physicians without such an obligation [32].  In 
contrast, in many developing countries health workers in private practice earn 
substantially more than their colleagues in the public sector, and opportunities for full- or 
part-time work in private practice may only exist in well-served urban areas and not in 
rural and remote areas where financial-incentive programmes offer positions.  Insofar as 22 
 
financial incentives simply compensate for income differentials between underserved and 
well-served areas, they are unlikely to be attractive.  Salary mark-ups specifically for 
participants in financial-incentive programmes, on the other hand, may not be feasible 
because they would imply that participants earn more than non-participants working in 
underserved areas, which may be difficult to justify.  Thus, in some developing countries, 
financial incentive programmes similar to the ones offered in the USA and other 
developed countries may not be successful, unless the incomes of all health workers in 
underserved areas are increased.  An example of such a universal change in salary 
structures is the “rural allowance” in South Africa, which was added in 2004 to the 
salaries of public-sector health workers in rural areas [92].  In some countries, work in 
underserved areas would be financially more attractive if health workers were allowed to 
rotate between the public sector in underserved areas and the private sector in well-served 
areas. 
 
Another limitation of the evidence is that it is exclusively based on observational studies, 
which do not allow to firmly establish causality in the relationship between programme 
participation and work in underserved areas.  On the one hand, financial-incentive 
programme may place health workers in underserved areas who would never have 
worked in such areas.  Further, financial-incentive programmes may expose participants 
who would have worked in underserved areas without any financial incentive to 
experiences, which they would not have had, had they not enrolled, and which increase 
their propensity to work in underserved areas in the long run.  On the other hand, health 
workers choose to participate in financial-incentive programmes and it is difficult to rule 23 
 
out the possibility that those workers who choose to participate would have practiced in 
underserved areas for exactly the same length of time (or even longer) without any 
financial incentive.  In order to strengthen the evidence on the effects of financial-
incentive programmes, researchers should conduct controlled experiments, wherever 
funders and policy makers are willing to support such studies. 
 
Comparison of financial-incentive programmes to other interventions to increase 
the supply of health workers in underserved areas 
Financial-incentive programmes are only one type of intervention to increase the supply 
of health workers in underserved areas.  Two other types are compulsory service and 
non-financial incentives.  In the following, we will briefly describe these two types of 
alternative interventions and then contrast them to financial-incentive programmes.   
  
Compulsory service vs. financial-inventive programmes 
Compulsory service policies require health workers (e.g., all doctors or all nurses) who 
are educated in a country to work for a period of time in an underserved area in that 
country.  Such programmes have been established in many countries worldwide.  
Beginning in the 1920s, the Soviet Union required all medical, dental, and nursing 
graduates to serve for three years in rural areas [93].  In 1936, Mexico started requiring 
six months of rural service as a condition for medical students to graduate from medical 
school.  The six-month requirement was later extended to one year [94].  Other countries 
in Latin America followed with similar programmes, including Cuba (in 1960) [95], the 
Dominican Republic (in the 1960s) [96, 97], Ecuador (in 1970) [94], and Bolivia (in 
1979) [94].  In Africa, Nigeria established a National Youth Service Corps in 1973, 24 
 
which requires all graduates of tertiary education institutions, including health workers, 
to serve for one year in underserved areas [98].  Since 1998, all South African medical 
graduates have had to perform a one-year “compulsory community service” [79].  
Compulsory service policies also exist in South Asia ( e.g., in several states of India [99, 
100]), the Middle East (e.g., Iraq [101]), and Europe (e.g., Greece [102]).   
 
While compulsory service is used widely, the evidence on its performance is scarce.  The 
2007 US Council on Graduate Medical Education Report New Paradigms for Physician 
Training for Improving Access to Health Care comes to the conclusion that “[t]he impact 
of these [compulsory service] programmes had been difficult to assess, and there is a 
dearth of rigorous studies of their effectiveness and viability. It is clear from existing 
information that it is possible to create and sustain such programmes over a period of 
decades, although not necessarily with enthusiastic support of those required to serve” 
[95].  The evidence that does exist is mainly on the satisfaction of health workers with 
their compulsory service.  An evaluation of the South African compulsory community 
service finds that 64% of the doctors felt that “they had developed professionally” during 
the service, but that their development had taken place mostly “in the area of gaining 
confidence and insight in themselves as practitioners, as opposed to formal learning of 
clinical skills from supervisors” [79].  Similarly, a study in Ecuador reports that 94% of 
health workers found “their [compulsory] year of rural service rewarding both personally 
and professionally” [94].  Many of the participants “commented on how much they 
learned about doctor-patient relations” and “[s]ome said they matured emotionally, 
learned the meaning of responsibility, and acquired greater self-confidence” [94].   25 
 
 
Because very few empirical studies have been published on compulsory service, a 
comparison of the programmes to financial-incentive programmes has to be based on 
theoretical considerations.  Table 2 outlines differences in the characteristics and possible 
effects between the two types of interventions.  The main difference is of course that 
compulsory service policies force all health workers (in a particular category) to serve, 
while financial-incentive programmes enrol only those health workers who choose to 
participate.  Thus, compulsory service policies (if they can be enforced) ensure that a 
substantial proportion of workers who – given the choice – would never have practiced in 
underserved areas do so for some period of time and that, at least in the short-term, such 
requirements will be effective in increasing the supply of health workers to underserved 
areas.  In contrast, financial-incentive programmes cannot ensure that they will be 
effective in recruiting health workers to underserved areas who would not have chosen to 
do so without financial incentive.   
 
Compulsion, however, implies a “loss of autonomy” and can create an “aversion”, which 
may lead to a number of negative consequences [95].  For one, the introduction of 
compulsory service may be difficult politically.  For instance, in 2008, a strike of medical 
students and doctors forced the government of Kerala, India, to reduce the planned 
compulsory rural service for doctors from three years to one year [103, 104].  Further, it 
is possible that health workers who are forced to work in an underserved area for some 
period of time are less likely to voluntarily work in such an area and more likely to 
emigrate to another country in the long run.   26 
 
 
Moreover, compulsory service may decrease the attractiveness of a health care education 
because it limits graduates’ choices of where to work.  As such, compulsory service could 
lead to fewer applicants to health care education institutions, which could reduce the total 
number of health workers educated per time (if the number of education places exceeds 
the number of qualified applicants) [35], or decrease the average quality of health care 
students (if education institutions lower entry requirements in order to fill their education 
places) [95].  In contrast, financial-incentive programmes could increase the total number 
of educated health workers and increase the proportion of students from poor 
backgrounds, if the financial incentives enable students who would otherwise not have 
been able to do so to pay for a health care education, and if a country’s education system 
can absorb the additional students.   
 
Non-financial incentives vs. financial incentives 
Health workers are not only motivated by financial compensation, but also by other 
factors, such as altruism, the satisfaction of successfully applying their skills in caring for 
their patients, and recognition from their peers.  For instance, a study in Benin and Kenya 
found in semi-structured interviews that nurses and doctors more commonly referred to 
“healing patients”, “vocation”, “professional satisfaction”, and “recognition by 
supervisors” than to “remuneration”, when asked what currently encourages them to do 
their work well [105].  A study in rural Vietnam found that “the main motivating factors 
for health workers were appreciation by managers, colleagues and the community, a 
stable job and income and training”, while “them main discouraging factors were related 27 
 
to low salaries and difficult working conditions” [106].  As such, non-financial factors 
should be expected to influence the supply of health workers in underserved areas.  A 
WHO study found that while health workers in the public sector in Cameroon, Ghana, 
South Africa, Uganda, and Zimbabwe most commonly considered “salaries” as one of the 
“key issues … that will motivate them to remain in the country” (between 68% and 85% 
of the respondents in the five countries), they also considered non-financial factors to be 
important in their migration decisions, for instance, the “working environment” (between 
36% and 81%) and “opportunities for education and training” (between 29%  and 67%) 
[107].   
 
In addition to such work-related factors, living conditions are likely to be important in 
determining health workers’ decisions to move to and remain in underserved areas.  In 
Ecuador, health workers fulfilling their compulsory service ranked transportation 
“highest as an adaptation problem, followed by, in descending order, communication, 
housing, food, and access to potable water and electrical power” [94].  In the US, 
physicians working in the Navajo Area India Health Services referred to “the poor local 
school system” and “marginal housing facilities” as reasons why they might leave their 
positions [108].  Rural doctors in Limpopo, a poor rural province of South Africa, 
provided a range of themes in response to the question about which interventions they 
thought would retain South African doctors in rural hospital service in the province, 
including financial incentives (“increasing salaries and rural allowances”), improvements 
in working conditions (such as “ensuring career progression”, “providing continuing 
medical education”, “improving the physical hospital infrastructure and rural referral 28 
 
systems”, “ensuring the availability of essential medical equipment and medicines”, and 
“strengthening rural hospital management”), and improvements in living conditions (such 
as “improving rural hospital accommodation”, “providing recreational facilities”, and 
“assisting rural doctors’ families”) [19]. 
 
Work-related factors that affect health workers’ location choices can potentially be 
influenced through investment in health care facilities, medical equipment and workplace 
safety [35], as well as through a range of management interventions [109, 110], such as 
training of supervisors [35], “quality improvement teams”, “team building”, 
“participatory problem assessments and problem-solving processes”, and “development 
of career development plans” [105].  Living conditions can be improved through 
investment in infrastructure in underserved areas, such as roads, electricity, 
telecommunication, water, sanitation and housing.  However, only a few countries (such 
as Thailand [111] and Zambia [112]) have implemented interventions to improve health 
workers’ working or living conditions in underserved areas, and evidence on their 
effectiveness in increasing the supply of health workers in those areas is largely lacking 
[3, 113]. 
 
In thinking about alternative interventions to increase the supply of health workers in 
underserved areas, governments and donors should bear in mind that such interventions 
are usually not mutually exclusive.  For instance, in South Africa the national compulsory 
community service [79] operates alongside national [92] and local [7] financial-incentive 
programmes.  Non-financial incentives improving health workers’ satisfaction with their 29 
 
professional and personal lives could be important in improving long-term retention of 
health workers in areas to which they were originally attracted by a financial incentive 
[22].  Zambia established a “Health Workers Retention Scheme” to improve the supply of 
doctors to “rural and underserved parts of Zambia”.  The scheme provides a financial 
incentive (a “rural hardship allowance”) and several non-financial incentives, including 
guaranteed eligibility for post-graduate training after three years of service and 
investment to improve housing for health workers in underserved areas [112].  
  
Policy makers should further consider that on the continuum from incentive to 
compulsion there are intermediate forms of interventions, which may be the best choices 
in particular situations.  For instance, in some countries practice in underserved area is 
not compulsory but necessary or desirable for acceptance into specialist training 
programmes [114].  Incentives, on the other hand, can come in the form of cash payments 
to the health worker, earmarked allowances for housing or schooling, fringe benefits 
(such as old-age pension or health insurance), and improvements in living and working 
conditions in underserved areas [35]. 
 
Conclusion 
Financial-incentive programmes for return of medical service in underserved areas have 
been used in both developed and developing countries.  Seven management functions are 
essential for the long-term success of such programmes: financing (programmes may 
benefit from innovative donor financing schemes, such endowment funds, international 
financing facilities, or compensation payments), promotion (programmes should utilize 30 
 
tested communication channels in order to reach secondary school graduates and health 
workers), selection (programmes may use selection criteria to ensure programme success 
and to achieve supplementary policy goals), placement (programmes may use matching 
of participants to areas to ensure programme success), support (programmes should 
prepare participants for their time in an underserved area, stay in close contact with 
participants throughout the different phases of enrolment, and help participants by 
assigning them mentors, establishing peer support systems, or financing education 
courses relevant to their work in underserved areas), enforcement (programmes may 
utilize community-based monitoring or outsource enforcement to existing institutions), 
and evaluation (in order to improve the evidence on the effectiveness of financial 
incentives in increasing the health workforce in underserved areas, programmes in 
developing countries should evaluate their performance).   
 
Financial-incentive programmes have a number of advantages and disadvantages in 
comparison to other interventions to increase the supply of health workers to medically 
underserved areas. Unlike non-financial incentives, they establish legally enforceable 
commitments to work in underserved areas; however, they may not improve the working 
or living conditions in underserved areas, which are important determinants of health 
workers’ long-term retention in those areas.  Unlike compulsory service policies, they 
will not be opposed by health workers; however, they cannot guarantee that they supply 
health workers to underserved areas who would not have worked in such areas without 
financial incentives.  Financial incentives, non-financial incentives, and compulsory 31 
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Table 2: Comparison of financial-incentive programmes to compulsory service  
 
  Financial-incentive programmes  Compulsory service 
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Table A1: Overview of evidence on financial-incentive programmes for return of medical service 
 
Study  Programme  Country  Type of study  Type of outcome  Conclusions 












54% of all participants fulfilled their service obligation and 4% 
repaid the financial incentive.  
51% of all participants practiced in small communities for most 




State scholarship and 
educational loan 
programmes 






60% of participants fulfilled their obligation to practice in an 
underserved area, 37% repaid the financial incentive. 
Across programmes, between 50% and 90% of participants 





Carolina  Rural Loan 
Program 







75% of participants fulfilled their obligation to practice in an 
underserved area. 
71% of participants in the financial-incentive programme were 

















59% of participants fulfilled their obligation to practice in an 
underserved area, while 37% of participants repaid the financial 
incentive 
85% of participants who fulfilled their obligation remained in 
Arizona. 
The programme did not succeed in increasing the medical 
student population density in Arizona. 48 
 

















53% of participants fulfilled their obligation to practice in an 
underserved area, while 47% repaid the financial incentive. 
74% of participants who fulfilled their obligation remained at 
the original placement location. 
The programme was effective in increasing the number of 












Increase in supply of physicians to underserved areas cannot be 
attributed to the programme.  












96% of all participants fulfilled their obligation to practice in an 
underserved area, while 4% repaid the financial incentive. 
67% of participants remained in the prefecture of original 
placement after having fulfilled their obligation. 











Provision of care 
98% of participants fulfilled their obligation to practice in an 
underserved area. 
Participants were more likely than non-participants to practice 
in a rural area. 
Matsumoto 







Provision of care 
After having fulfilled their obligation to practice in an 
underserved area, participants were about four times more likely 
to work in rural areas than non-participants. 
Matsumoto 








21% of participants of rural background, and only 12% of 
participants of urban background, remained in a rural area after 
having fulfilled their service obligation.  
Matsumoto 










95% of participants fulfilled their obligation to practice in an 
underserved area. 
Of all participants who had fulfilled their obligation at least 6 
years ago 70% remained in the prefecture of original placement. 49 
 
Study  Programme  Country  Type of study  Type of outcome  Conclusions 




USA Comparison  of 
characteristics 
of underserved 










Underserved communities that had less resources and higher 
need for health care were less likely to receive programme 










56% of the participants who were currently fulfilling their 
obligation intended to practice in a rural area after fulfilling 
their obligation. 
Stone et al. 
1991 [120] 
and Brown 











67% of participants who were currently fulfilling their practice 
obligation intended to remain in their placement site after 
fulfilling the obligation. 
Reasons for intending to leave the placement site included 
dissatisfaction with the community, the salary, and the 










Participants were about twice as likely to leave their practice of 
original placement and about 50% more likely to leave rural 










Participants were about half as likely to remain in a non-
metropolitan area and about three times less likely to remain in 















Five years after starting work at a practice site, participants were 
less than half as likely as non-participants to have remained at 
the site. 
Participants were less satisfied with their work and personal 
lives in the underserved area than non-participants. 50 
 












Minority and non-minority participants did not differ in their 
retention in the practice of original placement after having 
fulfilled their service obligation. 
Minority physicians reported lower satisfaction with their work 
and personal lives in the underserved area (for themselves and 
















Six years after having fulfilled their practice obligation 25% of 
participants continued to practice in the county of original 
placement, while 27% had left the original placement site to 
practice in another rural county. 
33% of participants rated their experience in the programme as 
“positive”. 











8-10 years after having graduated from medical school, 20% of 
the participants remained in the county of their original 
placement, while 40% remained in a rural county.  11-13 years 
after graduation these proportions had fallen to 17% and 36%, 
respectively.  14-16 years after graduation they had fallen to 
13% and 35%. 









Provision of care 
Participants were significantly more likely to practice in an 
underserved area ten years after graduating from medical school 
than non-participants. 







Provision of care 
30% of participants’ patients, but only 19% of non-participants’ 
patients, were either considered poor or had Medicaid as their 
primary insurance. 










After five years of work in a community health centre, 36% of 
participants, but only 17% of non-participants, still worked in 
the same centre. 
Rabinowitz 







Provision of care 
“Participation in the NHSC is the only experiential factor 
related to caring for the underserved”. 51 
 
Study  Programme  Country  Type of study  Type of outcome  Conclusions 









47% of participants continued to provide care to the 
underserved after their obligated service.   








Provision of care 
13% of rural primary care physicians, but only 3% of suburban 











7 to 17 years after starting to fulfil their practice obligation, 
53% of the participants still worked in an underserved area. 







Provision of care 
28% of the patients discharged by programme alumni were 
Medicaid patients, while only 19% of the patients discharged by 








Provision of care 
Retention 
 
Participants were less likely to remain in their first practice 
location than non-participants. 











The programme may have contributed to improvements in age-
adjusted mortality rates in underserved communities, in 
particular in communities that received programme participants 









The programme contributed 10-11% to the existing US 










Presence of a programme participant increased the supply of 
non-participating physicians in underserved areas on average by 
6%. 
Rittenhouse 







Provision of care 
Participants were significantly more likely to work in a 
community health centre than non-participating physicians. 
Weiss et al. 
1980 [136] 
Scholarship for 
Indian students in 
health sciences 





In a programme in which participants are not obligated to serve 
in an underserved area, 74% of participants decided to work in 
an underserved area. 52 
 












68% of participants fulfilled their practice obligation, while 
32% repaid the financial incentive. 
 












75% of participants fulfilled their obligation to practice in an 
underserved area, while 25 repaid the financial incentive. 
53% participants remained in the placement community after 
having fulfilled their obligation.  
Pathman et 
al. 2000 [32] 
National Health 
Service Corps 
Indian Health Service 
Corps 
State scholarships 








Provision of care 
 
 
In comparison to non-participants, participants in financial- 
incentive programmes were about five times more likely to 
practice in rural areas and 85% more likely to care for 
underserved populations. 
Dunbabin et 
al. 2006 [8] 
New South Wales 










About 87% of participants fulfilled their obligation to practice 
in a rural area. 
Retention in rural communities after completion of the 
obligation was substantial.  53 
 
Study  Programme  Country  Type of study  Type of outcome  Conclusions 
Jackson et 






















78% of participants fulfilled their obligation to practice in an 
underserved area. 
Retention in the first practice site was not significantly different 
between programme participants and non-participants. 
98% of programme participants, but only 85% of non-
participants, “agreed that clinical worker was personally 
rewarding”. 
Pathman et 






State loan repayment 
programmes 




State direct financial- 
incentive 
programmes for fully 
trained health 
professionals 










Participants in programmes that  enrolled physicians after 
graduation from medical school were more likely to fulfill their 
service obligation than participants in programmes that enrolled 
participants during medical school. 
Participants were about 25% less likely to remain at their site of 
first practice than non-participants. 
The majority of participants in a financial-incentive 
programmes were satisfied with their experience; their spouses 
were significantly less satisfied. 
 54 
 
Study  Programme  Country  Type of study  Type of outcome  Conclusions 
Ross 2007 
[7] 










All participants fulfilled their obligation to practice in the 
underserved area. 
 
 